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Full Idea
My doubts about functionalist accounts of qualia are based on the much discussed arguments from qualia inversions, and from epistemic considerations.
Clarification
'Inversions' are seeing marigold where others see violet; 'epistemic' means to do with knowledge
Gist of Idea
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
Source
Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.102)
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.102
A Reaction
With a colour inversion experience changes but function doesn't. But maybe function does change if you ask the right questions. 'Is this a warm colour?' It certainly strikes me that qualia contain useful (epistemic) information.
| 7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
| 7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
| 7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| 7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |