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Single Idea 23287

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth ]

Full Idea

Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate.

Gist of Idea

Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.10


A Reaction

Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12]


The 9 ideas from 'Truth Rehabilitated'

Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]