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Full Idea
We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages.
Gist of Idea
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.11
A Reaction
Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number.
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |