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Full Idea
We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages.
Gist of Idea
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
Source
Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.11
A Reaction
Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number.
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |