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Single Idea 23294

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues ]

Full Idea

You are following Plato's lead if you worry about the concept of truth when it is the focus of your attention, but you pretend you understand it when trying to cope with knowledge (or belief, memory, perception etc.).

Gist of Idea

It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge

Source

Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.20)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.20

A Reaction

Nice to find someone pointing out this absurdity. He says Hume does the same with doubts about the external world, which he ignores when discussing other minds. Belief is holding true; only truths are actually remembered….

The 15 ideas with the same theme [areas of interest concerning justification]:

6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
8836 Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
8837 Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
12413 A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
3564 Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
21626 Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
4722 Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
19729 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]