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Full Idea
If the definition of the truth predicate is to be finite (Tarski insisted on this), the definition must take advantage of the fact that sentences, though potentially infinite in number, are constructed from a finite vocabulary.
Gist of Idea
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite
Source
Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.23)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.23
A Reaction
Not sure whether this is in the object language or the meta-language, though I guess the former.
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |