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Full Idea
Neither Aristotle's formula nor Tarski's truth definitions are sympathetic to the correspondence theory, because they don't introduce entities like facts or states of affairs for sentences to correspond.
Gist of Idea
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
Source
Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.25)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.25
A Reaction
This seems convincing, although it is often claimed that both theories offer a sort of correspondence.
Related Idea
Idea 586 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |