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Single Idea 23299

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth ]

Full Idea

Horwich's brave and striking move is to make the primary bearers of truth propositions - not exactly a new idea in itself, but new in the context of a serious attempt to defend deflationism.

Gist of Idea

Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences

Source

report of Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990]) by Donald Davidson - The Folly of Trying to Define Truth p.30

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth, Language and History' [OUP 2005], p.30


A Reaction

Davidson rejects propositions because they can't be individuated, but I totally accept propositions. I'm puzzled why this would produce a deflationist theory, since I think it points to a much more robust view.


The 12 ideas from 'Truth (2nd edn)'

Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]