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Single Idea 2330
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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Full Idea
Mental states have vastly diverse physical/biological realizations in different species and structures (e.g. pain in humans and in molluscs), so no mental state can be identified with any single physical/biological state.
Clarification
Because molluscs and humans have different nervous systems
Gist of Idea
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state
Source
report of Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World n p.120
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.120
A Reaction
But maybe mollusc and human nervous systems ARE the same in the respects that matter. We don't know enough about pain to deny that possibility.
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[lots of way to implement a thought]:
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6376
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Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity
[Polger on Putnam]
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2330
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If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state
[Putnam, by Kim]
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7432
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One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
[Armstrong]
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3429
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Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
[Davidson, by Kim]
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3497
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If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
[Searle]
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6992
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If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
[Jackson]
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2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
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4892
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If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
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7443
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A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia
[Lewis, by PG]
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4878
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The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors
[Dennett]
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2579
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Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds
[Block]
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2598
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Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
[Fodor]
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3981
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Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
[Fodor]
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3512
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If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
[Papineau]
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4985
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If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
[Kirk,R]
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3185
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Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts
[McGinn]
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6542
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A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
[Chalmers]
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
[Heil]
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4619
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'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
[Heil]
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4620
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Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
[Heil]
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4933
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Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes
[Edelman/Tononi]
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7734
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Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's
[PG]
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7735
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Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally
[PG]
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