more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Mental states have vastly diverse physical/biological realizations in different species and structures (e.g. pain in humans and in molluscs), so no mental state can be identified with any single physical/biological state.
Clarification
Because molluscs and humans have different nervous systems
Gist of Idea
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state
Source
report of Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World n p.120
Book Ref
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Mind in the Physical World' [MIT 2000], p.120
A Reaction
But maybe mollusc and human nervous systems ARE the same in the respects that matter. We don't know enough about pain to deny that possibility.
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |