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Single Idea 23318
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
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Full Idea
It is past failures (of training, discipline, reflection…), rather than a specific mental event, a choice or a decision, which in Aristotle accounts for akratic action.
Gist of Idea
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice
Source
report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148a10) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2
Book Ref
Frede,Michael: 'A Free Will' [Univ of California 2011], p.24
A Reaction
This is to demonstrate that Aristotle has no concept of a 'will' which arbitrates over difficult choices. What we call 'willing' he applies only to choices which are rational.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[failing to perform the action which is judged best]:
22511
|
Some reasonings are stronger than we are
[Philolaus]
|
195
|
No one willingly commits an evil or base act
[Socrates]
|
199
|
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it
[Socrates]
|
1653
|
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia)
[Vlastos on Socrates]
|
5843
|
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do
[Socrates, by Xenophon]
|
5253
|
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens
[Aristotle on Socrates]
|
24060
|
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires
[Aristotle]
|
4383
|
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
68
|
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire
[Aristotle]
|
4318
|
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action.
[Aristotle, by Cottingham]
|
4372
|
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it
[Achtenberg on Aristotle]
|
5254
|
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge
[Aristotle]
|
5255
|
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular
[Aristotle]
|
23317
|
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
23318
|
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
5257
|
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance
[Aristotle]
|
23918
|
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure
[Aristotle]
|
22574
|
A community can lack self-control
[Aristotle]
|
20850
|
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust
[Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
|
19365
|
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad
[Leibniz, by Perkins]
|
22098
|
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good
[Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
|
7209
|
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse
[Nietzsche]
|
24117
|
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control
[Nietzsche]
|
23878
|
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action
[Weil]
|
6385
|
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
[Davidson]
|
4317
|
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded
[Williams,B, by Cottingham]
|
23996
|
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions
[Blackburn]
|
4355
|
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
[Hursthouse]
|
23995
|
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate
[Goldie]
|
20077
|
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency
[Stout,R]
|