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Single Idea 23338
[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
]
Full Idea
What are you saying, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not even Zeus himself can get the better of my choice.
Gist of Idea
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice
Source
Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.23)
Book Ref
Epictetus: 'The Discourses, The Handbook, Fragments', ed/tr. Gill,C [Everyman 1995], p.7
A Reaction
This seems to be the beginning of the idea of 'absolute' freedom, which is conjured up to preserve perfect inegrity and complete responsibility. Obviously you can be prevented from doing what you choose, so this is not compatibilism.
Related Idea
Idea 23342
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[defences of the existence of wills which are free]:
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22504
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Only a human being can be a starting point for an action
[Aristotle]
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14516
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There is no necessity to live with necessity
[Epicurus]
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20834
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Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural
[Plutarch on Chrysippus]
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23338
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You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice
[Epictetus]
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1856
|
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
[Aquinas]
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1861
|
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
[Aquinas]
|
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1862
|
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
[Aquinas]
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1853
|
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
[Aquinas]
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1849
|
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
[Aquinas]
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2282
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My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could
[Descartes]
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4310
|
We have inner awareness of our freedom
[Descartes]
|
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23668
|
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will
[Reid]
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23680
|
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects
[Reid]
|
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9756
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We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires
[Kant, by Korsgaard]
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5597
|
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
[Kant]
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3740
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We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
[Kant]
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21965
|
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will
[Fichte]
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20322
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I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom
[Jaspers]
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3444
|
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
[Chisholm]
|
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3808
|
Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
|
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3818
|
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
|
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3817
|
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
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