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Full Idea
The effect of my account, as of Kripke's, is to separate the question of how the reference of terms such as 'gold' is fixed from the question of their conceptual content.
Gist of Idea
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content
Source
Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §2 p.38)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Representation and Reality' [MIT 1992], p.38
A Reaction
Too simple. 'Gold' isn't a proper name, like 'Hilary', which needs no more content than a serial number. Baptising a gold sample needs much more information than baptising a person.
| 2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
| 2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
| 16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
| 17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
| 12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |