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Single Idea 23453

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one.

Gist of Idea

Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one

Source

B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E

Book Ref

Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.84

A Reaction

This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs?

The 14 ideas with the same theme [propositions as made of real objects]:

21726 In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
21702 In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
23453 Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
19164 If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
21662 Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
16380 Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]