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Single Idea 23453

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one.

Gist of Idea

Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one

Source

B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E

Book Ref

Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.84


A Reaction

This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs?


The 26 ideas from 'Principia Mathematica'

Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]