more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 23454

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception ]

Full Idea

That which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the 'form' of appearance.

Gist of Idea

Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B034/A20)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.155


A Reaction

An important idea, which figures prominently in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Presumably the noumenon is responsible for generating the form in the appearances, and we infer the order of the world thereby (though we can't prove it).


The 21 ideas with the same theme [inference is an essential part of perception]:

Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant]
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte]
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden]
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane]
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]