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Single Idea 23469
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
]
Full Idea
It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something - a form - in common with it.
Gist of Idea
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.022)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.7
A Reaction
It is clear that Wittgenstein had a concept of possible worlds close to the modern view.
Related Idea
Idea 23465
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[overview of what we take possible worlds to be]:
23507
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Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them
[Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
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23469
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An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
[Wittgenstein]
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15786
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Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology
[Hintikka]
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16992
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Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
[Kripke]
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16983
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Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things
[Kripke]
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11980
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A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
[Plantinga]
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6975
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Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
[Jackson]
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4898
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Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
[Perry]
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14507
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Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well?
[Adams,RM]
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16437
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Possible worlds are properties
[Stalnaker]
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16444
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Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
[Stalnaker]
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16445
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I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
[Stalnaker]
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15793
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We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology
[Stalnaker, by Lycan]
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16396
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Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
[Stalnaker]
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14285
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A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
[Stalnaker]
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16284
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Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
[Lewis]
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13968
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Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been
[Soames]
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14675
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Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent
[Salmon,N]
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14672
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Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been
[Salmon,N]
|
15795
|
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
[Lycan]
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15796
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Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties
[Lycan]
|
12007
|
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
[Forbes,G]
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7688
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The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
[Jacquette]
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15069
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Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out
[Fine,K]
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15068
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The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities
[Fine,K]
|
9213
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been'
[Fine,K]
|
8963
|
Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete
[Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
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10466
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Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes
[Bacon,John]
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14189
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds
[Paul,LA]
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14002
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Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world
[Markosian]
|
18872
|
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
[Cameron]
|
15432
|
Structural universals might serve as possible worlds
[Forrest, by Lewis]
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