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Single Idea 23475

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error ]

Full Idea

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A judges p' must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition).

Gist of Idea

The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5422)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.54


A Reaction

In Notebooks p.96 LW gives the example 'this table penholders the book'. I take it Russell wanted judgement to impose unified meaning on sentences, but LW shows that assembling meaning must precede judgement. LW is right.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [how incorrect judgements occur]:

I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza]
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]