more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 23480

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement ]

Full Idea

When Russell moved to his multiple relation theory of judgement …he then faced difficulties making sense of the unity of sentences.

Gist of Idea

The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences

Source

comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3A

Book Ref

Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.117


A Reaction

Roughly, he seems committed to saying that there is only unity if you think there is unity; there is no unity in a sentence prior to the act of judgement.


The 26 ideas from 'Principia Mathematica'

Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]