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Single Idea 23483

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts ]

Full Idea

Correlation need only be between elements of the picture and things in reality; it is not also required that there be a correspondence between the picture as a whole and a fact in reality - so things can be depicted falsely.

Gist of Idea

Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact

Source

report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.15121) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3C

Book Ref

Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.129


A Reaction

To turn his picture theory into a correspondence theory of truth would need a further step, of saying the proposition is true when the two structures coincide. I don't think LW says that.

Related Ideas

Idea 4702 The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]

Idea 10967 Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [how things are, independently of thought]:

Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P]
The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P]
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch]
Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]