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Full Idea
According to the Principle of Bipolarity, every meaningful sentence must be capable both of being true and of being false. It is not enough merely that every sentence must be either true or false (which is Bivalence).
Gist of Idea
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values
Source
Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], 3D)
Book Ref
Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.133
A Reaction
It is said that early Wittgenstein endorses this. That is, in addition to being true, the sentence must be capable of falsehood (and vice versa). This seems to be flirting with the verification principle. I presume it is 'affirmative' sentences.
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |