more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 23490
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
]
Full Idea
Does a Gedanke [thought] consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words.
Gist of Idea
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919], p.125), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 4B
Book Ref
Morris,Michael: 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' [Routledge 2008], p.157
A Reaction
This is roughly my view of propositions, as non-lingustic mental events. The 'psychical constituents' seem to be concepts, in a psychological rather than a Fregean sense. This idea allowed transfer of his representation theory from thought to language.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[propositions as features of thought]:
|
13763
|
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all
[Aristotle]
|
|
23404
|
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words
[Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
|
|
6024
|
Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying
[Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
|
|
23322
|
Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false
[Stoic school, by Frede,M]
|
|
9105
|
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language
[William of Ockham]
|
|
6718
|
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
|
|
6435
|
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
|
|
22307
|
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact
[Russell]
|
|
23490
|
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
13981
|
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion
[Ryle]
|
|
13987
|
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French
[Ryle]
|
|
9084
|
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true
[Plantinga]
|
|
13943
|
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said
[Cartwright,R]
|
|
13946
|
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words
[Cartwright,R]
|
|
15154
|
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa
[Soames]
|
|
6632
|
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
|
|
9133
|
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences
[Sorensen]
|
|
8484
|
If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
[Orenstein]
|
|
22250
|
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance
[Recanati]
|
|
16298
|
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages
[Halbach]
|