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Full Idea
If there were an object called 'not', it would follow that 'not-not-p' would say something different from what 'p' said, just because the one proposition would then be about 'not', and the other would not.
Gist of Idea
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.44)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.45
A Reaction
That is, the first proposition would be about not-p, and the second would be about p. Assuming we can say what such things are 'about'. A rather good argument that the connectives are not entities. P and double-negated P should be indistinguishable.
20788 | The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |