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Single Idea 23498
[filed under theme 16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
]
Full Idea
Therre is no such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
Gist of Idea
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5421)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.54
A Reaction
This seems to endorse Descartes' claim about the essential unity of the mind. I think Hume is in the background of LW's thought. Presumably the psychologist offered a 'composite' view. Prior discussion of belief leads into this remark.
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[denial that there is any such thing as a 'Self']:
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5517
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Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements
[Buddha]
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7277
|
The perfect man has no self
[Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
|
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7286
|
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant
[Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
|
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7906
|
When the Buddha reached the highest level of insight, he could detect no self in the world
[Ashvaghosha]
|
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21294
|
A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have
[Hume]
|
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21295
|
When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them
[Hume]
|
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21298
|
We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps
[Hume]
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21304
|
Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same
[Hume]
|
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21308
|
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it
[Hume]
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21310
|
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that?
[Hume]
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4175
|
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself
[Schopenhauer]
|
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24099
|
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind
[Nietzsche]
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7148
|
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being
[Nietzsche]
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7138
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The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable'
[Nietzsche]
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4527
|
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought
[Nietzsche]
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6475
|
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar
[Russell]
|
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20114
|
Everyone is other, and no one is himself
[Heidegger]
|
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23498
|
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
[Wittgenstein]
|
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7115
|
Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence
[Sartre]
|
|
7121
|
The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World
[Sartre]
|
|
7370
|
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
[Dennett]
|
|
7655
|
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies
[Dennett]
|
|
5518
|
It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system)
[Parfit]
|
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5349
|
For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion
[Flanagan]
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