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Single Idea 23540

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness ]

Full Idea

If 'P is red' and 'P is orange' are indefinite, then 'P is red and P is orange' seems false, because red and orange are exclusive. But if two conjoined indefinite sentences are false, that makes 'P is red and P is red' false, when it should be indefinite.

Gist of Idea

Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction

Source

Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Vagueness: a global approach' [OUP 2020], p.10


A Reaction

[compressed] This is the problem of 'penumbral connection', where two indefinite values are still logically related, by excluding one another. Presumably 'P is red and P is of indefinite shape' can be true? Doubtful about this argument.


The 7 ideas with the same theme [why vagueness matters to philosophy]:

Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]