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Full Idea
Standard notions of vagueness all accept borderline cases, and presuppose a higher standpoint from which a judgement of being borderline F, rather than simply being F or being not F, can be made.
Gist of Idea
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen
Source
Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3)
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Vagueness: a global approach' [OUP 2020], p.52
A Reaction
He says that the concept of borderline cases is an impediment to understanding vagueness. Proposing a third group when you are struggling to separate two other groups doesn't seem helpful, come to think of it. Limbo cases.
| 23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
| 23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
| 23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
| 23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
| 23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
| 23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
| 23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
| 23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
| 23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |