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Single Idea 23547

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Pace Parfit and others, it boggles the mind that survival could be independent of any relation of identity between the currently existing object and the objects that subsequently exist.

Gist of Idea

It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival

Source

Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Vagueness: a global approach' [OUP 2020], p.65


A Reaction

Yes. If the self or mind just consists of a diachronic trail of memories such that the two ends of the trail have no connection at all, that isn't the kind of survival that any of us want. I want to live my life, not a life.


The 10 ideas from 'Vagueness: a global approach'

Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]