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Full Idea
In Tyler Burge's view we have an a priori entitlement for believing what others tell us, other things being equal.
Gist of Idea
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony
Source
Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 1.3 n11)
Book Ref
Fricker,Miranda: 'Epistemic Injustice' [OUP 2007], p.18
A Reaction
[Burge 'Content Preservation' 1992] Close to Davidson's Charity (that without a default assumption of truth-speaking language won't work at all). Davidson is right about casual conversation, but for important testimony Burge should be more cautious.
Related Idea
Idea 23549 We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]
| 23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
| 23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
| 23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
| 23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
| 23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
| 23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
| 23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
| 23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |