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Full Idea
A person should receive the word of his interlocutor in the light of the probability that someone like that would (be able and willing to) to tell someone like him the truth about something like this in circumstances like these.
Gist of Idea
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances
Source
Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.2)
Book Ref
Fricker,Miranda: 'Epistemic Injustice' [OUP 2007], p.71
A Reaction
That's a pretty good summary of the rational response to testimony. I can't think of any other factors.
Related Idea
Idea 23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
| 23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
| 23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
| 23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
| 23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
| 23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
| 23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
| 23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
| 23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |