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Single Idea 23554

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement ]

Full Idea

Our idea of testimonial sensibility is a spontaneous critical sensitivity permanently in training and adapting to experience. …This gives us a picture of how judgements can be rational yet unreflective, critical yet non-inferential.

Gist of Idea

Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience

Source

Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.4)

Book Ref

Fricker,Miranda: 'Epistemic Injustice' [OUP 2007], p.84


A Reaction

Love this. I want to connect human reasoning to good judgement by animals, and I offer the word 'sensible' to bridge the gap. Dogs and scientists can be sensible. Fricker spells out more fully what I have in mind, with reference to testimony.


The 8 ideas from 'Epistemic Injustice'

Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]