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Full Idea
I think that identifying forms of moral resentment that fall short of blame but which are agent-directed is the key to achieving appropriate moral response across historical and cultural distance.
Gist of Idea
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame
Source
Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 4.2)
Book Ref
Fricker,Miranda: 'Epistemic Injustice' [OUP 2007], p.107
A Reaction
Very good. Simple blame for horrible actions performed in remote rather horrible societies is pointless. But switching off moral sensibilities when reading history and anthropology looks like a slippery slope, so 'moral resentment' is nice.
| 23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
| 23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
| 23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
| 23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
| 23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
| 23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
| 23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
| 23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |