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Single Idea 23643
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
]
Full Idea
Every man feels he must believe what he distinctly remembers, though he can give no other reason for his belief, but that he remembers the thing distinctly; whereas, when he merely distinctly imagines a thing, he has no belief in it upon that account.
Gist of Idea
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings)
Source
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], 1)
Book Ref
Reid,Thomas: 'Inquiry and Essays', ed/tr. Beanblossom /K.Lehrer [Hackett 1983], p.207
A Reaction
The word 'distinct' is doing some heavy work here. I fear that believing the memory is the only criterion we have for calling it distinct. As a boy I was persuaded to change my testimony about a car accident, and I realised I was not distinct about it.
The
16 ideas
from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'
23644
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Without memory we could have no concept of duration
[Reid]
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23643
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We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings)
[Reid]
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1356
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A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees
[Reid]
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1359
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Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility
[Reid]
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21319
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I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent
[Reid]
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21323
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The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case
[Reid]
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21321
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Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses
[Reid]
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1350
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Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist
[Reid]
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21322
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We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language
[Reid]
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21320
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Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
[Reid]
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1352
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Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't
[Reid]
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1367
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Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
[Reid]
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21324
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If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20
[Reid]
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21325
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Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!
[Reid]
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21327
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If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
[Reid]
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1366
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If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
[Reid]
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