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Single Idea 23644

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory ]

Full Idea

It is impossible to show how we could acquire a notion of duration if we had no memory.

Gist of Idea

Without memory we could have no concept of duration

Source

Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], 1)

Book Ref

Reid,Thomas: 'Inquiry and Essays', ed/tr. Beanblossom /K.Lehrer [Hackett 1983], p.208


A Reaction

We would probably not have a notion of duration if we possessed a memory, but nothing ever changed. Maybe in Shoemaker's frozen worlds they retain memories, but nothing happens?

Related Idea

Idea 8595 If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker]


The 16 ideas from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]