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Full Idea
The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.
Gist of Idea
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
Source
Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161)
Book Ref
Foot,Philippa: 'Virtues and Vices' [Blackwell 1981], p.161
A Reaction
This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires.
| 23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
| 22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| 22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |