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Full Idea
The Humean view says properties are 'quiddities', which individuates properties by nothing more than their distinctness from one another, so that dispositions are not essential to them, and there is no limit to possible property recombination.
Gist of Idea
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness
Source
report of Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 3.3.1) by PG - Db (ideas)
Book Ref
Friend/Kimpton-Nye: 'Dispositions and Powers' [CUP 2023], p.48
A Reaction
[my summary] All of this is implied by Hume, rather than stated. David Lewis supports this view. The theory of basic powers is the view's main opponent. This quidditist view is not found in physics, where a property's modal profile matters.
Related Ideas
Idea 23706 Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Idea 23709 Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |