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Single Idea 23723
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
]
Full Idea
According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all.
Gist of Idea
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.8
A Reaction
This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason?
Related Idea
Idea 23724
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[desires and emotions as the main motivator of action]:
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1540
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Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad
[Democritus]
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7408
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It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own
[Hobbes, by Tuck]
|
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2362
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The will is just the last appetite before action
[Hobbes]
|
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20305
|
Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence
[Spinoza]
|
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5489
|
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
|
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3814
|
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
|
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23724
|
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
|
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23723
|
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
|
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23735
|
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
|
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23736
|
A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
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23738
|
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
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23739
|
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
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23742
|
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
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23746
|
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
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20202
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Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
[Zagzebski]
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20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause
[Stout,R]
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20046
|
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it
[Stout,R]
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