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Single Idea 23730
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
]
Full Idea
Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it.
Gist of Idea
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.62
A Reaction
That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view.
Related Ideas
Idea 23729
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
Idea 23731
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
The
20 ideas
from 'The Moral Problem'
23728
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Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
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23724
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A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
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23723
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In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
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23727
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Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
|
23729
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Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating
[Smith,M]
|
23730
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'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
[Smith,M]
|
23731
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'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
[Smith,M]
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23732
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A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it
[Smith,M]
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23733
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Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
[Smith,M]
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23735
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Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
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23736
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A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
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23738
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Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
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23739
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Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
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23740
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Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
[Smith,M]
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23741
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Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
[Smith,M]
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23742
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If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
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23746
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Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
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23744
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Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough
[Smith,M]
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23743
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Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible
[Smith,M]
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23745
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We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
[Smith,M]
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