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Single Idea 23730

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics ]

Full Idea

Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it.

Gist of Idea

'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it

Source

Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1)

Book Ref

Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.62

A Reaction

That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view.

Related Ideas

Idea 23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]

Idea 23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]

The 20 ideas from 'The Moral Problem'

23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]