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Single Idea 23733
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
]
Full Idea
There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'.
Gist of Idea
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.96
A Reaction
Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected.
The
20 ideas
from 'The Moral Problem'
23728
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Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
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23724
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A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
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23723
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In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
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23727
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Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
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23729
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Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating
[Smith,M]
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23730
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'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
[Smith,M]
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23731
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'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
[Smith,M]
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23732
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A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it
[Smith,M]
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23733
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Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
[Smith,M]
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23735
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Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
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23736
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A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
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23738
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Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
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23739
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Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
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23740
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Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
[Smith,M]
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23741
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Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
[Smith,M]
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23742
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If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
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23746
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Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
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23744
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Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough
[Smith,M]
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23743
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Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible
[Smith,M]
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23745
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We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
[Smith,M]
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