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Full Idea
Davidson argues that the best interpretation of the teleological character of reason explanations is an intepretation in causal terms.
Gist of Idea
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.4
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.103
A Reaction
That is, this is the explanation of someone doing something 'because' they have this reason (rather than happening to have a reason). Smith observes that other mental states (such as beliefs) may also have this causal power.
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |