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Single Idea 23735

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires ]

Full Idea

It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have.

Gist of Idea

Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions

Source

Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5)

Book Ref

Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.107

A Reaction

[I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond.

The 20 ideas from Michael Smith

23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]