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Single Idea 23740
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
]
Full Idea
The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires.
Gist of Idea
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.130
A Reaction
Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous.
Related Idea
Idea 23733
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[reasoning processes that lead to action]:
5839
|
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing
[Socrates, by Xenophon]
|
4371
|
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value
[Achtenberg on Aristotle]
|
69
|
We deliberate about means, not ends
[Aristotle]
|
73
|
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite
[Aristotle]
|
20212
|
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings
[Aristotle]
|
5247
|
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct
[Aristotle]
|
80
|
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them
[Aristotle]
|
5249
|
One cannot be prudent without being good
[Aristotle]
|
82
|
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues
[Aristotle]
|
22508
|
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point
[Aristotle]
|
22514
|
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes
[Aristotle]
|
1836
|
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul
[Epicurus]
|
2363
|
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars
[Hobbes]
|
19343
|
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost
[Leibniz]
|
6692
|
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires
[Hume, by Graham]
|
23678
|
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action
[Reid]
|
6190
|
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
[Kant]
|
21059
|
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them
[Kant]
|
4173
|
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives
[Schopenhauer]
|
24184
|
What matters about an action is not its aim, but the origin of its compulsion
[Weil]
|
23437
|
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
[Foot]
|
23694
|
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
[Foot]
|
22480
|
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
[Foot]
|
6384
|
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will
[Davidson]
|
3840
|
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
|
4316
|
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means
[Cottingham]
|
12627
|
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
[Fodor]
|
3546
|
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence
[Annas]
|
23733
|
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
[Smith,M]
|
23740
|
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
[Smith,M]
|
23745
|
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
[Smith,M]
|
24000
|
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable
[Goldie]
|