more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 23741
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
]
Full Idea
What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma.
Gist of Idea
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.136
A Reaction
Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them.
The
20 ideas
from Michael Smith
23728
|
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
|
23723
|
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
|
23724
|
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
|
23727
|
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
|
23729
|
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating
[Smith,M]
|
23730
|
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
[Smith,M]
|
23731
|
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
[Smith,M]
|
23732
|
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it
[Smith,M]
|
23733
|
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
[Smith,M]
|
23736
|
A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
|
23735
|
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
|
23738
|
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
|
23739
|
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
|
23740
|
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
[Smith,M]
|
23741
|
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
[Smith,M]
|
23742
|
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
|
23746
|
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
|
23744
|
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough
[Smith,M]
|
23743
|
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible
[Smith,M]
|
23745
|
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
[Smith,M]
|