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Single Idea 23746
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
]
Full Idea
One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality.
Gist of Idea
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9)
Book Ref
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.175
A Reaction
This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration…
The
20 ideas
from 'The Moral Problem'
23728
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Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
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23723
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In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism
[Smith,M]
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23724
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A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief
[Smith,M]
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23727
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Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
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23731
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'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
[Smith,M]
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23729
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Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating
[Smith,M]
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23730
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'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it
[Smith,M]
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23732
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A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it
[Smith,M]
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23733
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Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external
[Smith,M]
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23736
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A person can have a desire without feeling it
[Smith,M]
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23735
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Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions
[Smith,M]
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23738
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Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate
[Smith,M]
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23739
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Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us
[Smith,M]
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23740
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Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions
[Smith,M]
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23741
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Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?
[Smith,M]
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23742
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If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win
[Smith,M]
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23746
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Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person
[Smith,M]
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23745
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We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action
[Smith,M]
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23743
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Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible
[Smith,M]
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23744
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Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough
[Smith,M]
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