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Full Idea
Some theorists maintain that all states with representational content or intentionality must have phenomenal character …and we can also ask whether all states with phenomenal character also have representional content.
Gist of Idea
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
Source
Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 2.4)
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.3
A Reaction
He mentions that beliefs could involve inner speech. And pains and moods may be phenomenal but lack content. He also asks which determines which.
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |