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Full Idea
We can say that non-Fregean content [reference] is (virtually) always contrued as broad, while Fregean content [sense] is usually contrued as narrow.
Clarification
'Broad' content involves things outside the mind
Gist of Idea
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
Source
Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 3.2)
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.13
A Reaction
I can't make sense of mental content actually being outside the mind, so I see all content as narrow - but that doesn't mean that externals are irrelevant to it. If I think that is an oak, and it's an elm, the content is oak.
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |