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Single Idea 23794

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content ]

Full Idea

Evans introduced the idea that there are some representational states, for example perceptual experiences, which have content that is nonconceptual.

Gist of Idea

Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual

Source

report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 3.4

Book Ref

Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.17

A Reaction

McDowell famously disagree, and whether all experience is inherently conceptualised is a main debate from that period. Hard to see how it could be settled, but I incline to McDowell, because minimal perception hardly counts as 'experience'.

The 23 ideas from Gareth Evans

9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
7639 The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
14895 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
11881 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]