more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Evans introduced the idea that there are some representational states, for example perceptual experiences, which have content that is nonconceptual.
Gist of Idea
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
Source
report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 3.4
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.17
A Reaction
McDowell famously disagree, and whether all experience is inherently conceptualised is a main debate from that period. Hard to see how it could be settled, but I incline to McDowell, because minimal perception hardly counts as 'experience'.
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |