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Full Idea
Naturalistic accounts of content ask 1) what makes a state qualify as a representational state?, and 2) what makes a representational state have one specific content rather than another?
Gist of Idea
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
Source
Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4)
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.19
A Reaction
[As often in this collection, the author uses algebraic letters, but I prefer plain English] I would say that the first question looks more amenable to an answer than the second. Do we know the neuronal difference between seeing red and blue?
Related Idea
Idea 23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |