more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Information theories of content [usually assume that] a column of smoke over there carries the information that fire is over there because it raises the probability of fire being over there.
Gist of Idea
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable
Source
Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.2)
Book Ref
Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.28
A Reaction
Theorists usually add further conditions to this basic one. Fred Dretske is the source of this approach. Not promising, in my opinion. Surely the content is just smoke, and fire is one of dozens of possible inferences from it?
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |